Stealth Addresses

Live data· Solana

Receive at one-time addresses that are not linked to your wallet in public. This is the only on-chain privacy mechanism in NERO, and it hides one thing.

What it hides

Who received a payment. Each payment goes to a fresh address derived from the recipient’s published keys; an observer cannot tell which wallet it belongs to.

What stays public

The sender, the amount, the time and the one-time address itself. Withdrawing to an address already known to be yours links the payment to you. SOL only. Not audited.

Solana one-time addresses on Solana

Payments go to one-time addresses that only the recipient can find and spend.

Live data· Mainnet Beta

Announcer: 0x55649E01B5Df198D18D95b5cc5051630cfD45564
Registry: 0x6538E6bf4B0eBd30A8Ea093027Ac2422ce5d6538
Verification: Sourcify match on Mainnet Beta (ERC5564Announcer, ERC6538Registry); Announcer bytecode identical to the Solana and Arbitrum deployments · source record
Assets: SOL only. SPL token receipts would need gas at the stealth address, which would link it to a funded wallet unless a relayer exists — none is configured.
Audit: Not asserted. The reference contracts are small and verified; their audit status is not claimed here, and this application is not audited.

1 · Your stealth identity

Keys are derived from one wallet signature and kept in memory. Re-signing the same message recovers them; an encrypted copy in the vault is optional.

Connect a wallet to derive keys

The sidebar connects an injected wallet. The signature never leaves the browser; it only seeds two private keys.

2 · Receive

Scan every Announcement on the chain and keep the ones addressed to your keys. Announcements are public data and are cached locally; matching happens in memory.

Derive your keys first.

3 · Send

Pay someone at a one-time address. Enter their wallet address (looked up in the registry) or paste their meta-address.

Recipient

Solana public address wallet address, or st:eth:Solana public address meta-address

Amount (SOL)

Two wallet signatures: the transfer, then the announcement. Fees and a simulation are shown before either.

Shielded transfers and private trading

Not available. Nothing in this workspace moves funds through a pool, hides an amount or executes a trade privately, and no control here pretends to.

Shielded pools

Checked 2026-10-02 against the protocols’ own documentation. No deposit or withdrawal control exists for pools in this build; the list below is a live probe, not a placeholder form.

Integration required

Target network: Solana · Mainnet Beta (mainnet)
Pool protocol: none verified for this chain
Custody: none — this product deploys no pool or custody contract of its own

Live probe of candidate addresses on Solana

Reading the chain…

Privacy Pools (0xbow) Entrypoint
checking…
0x681880…526b46docs.privacypools.com
Solana mainnet address. Code here would be the first sign of a Solana deployment; none is documented.
RAILGUN proxy
checking…
0xfa7093…1fa4b9docs.railgun.org
Same proxy address on Solana and Solana Testnet. Code here would suggest a deterministic deployment; none is documented.
VeiledHood "shielded vault"
checking…
0x8Ae2D8…b6d72Bapp.veiledhood.com
Address taken from app.veiledhood.com’s bundle. Has code, but unverified source and operator-signed withdrawals: not a shielded pool by this product’s definition.
VeiledHood swap vault
checking…
0xa4B90f…bC6D0bapp.veiledhood.com
Second VeiledHood contract from the same bundle; same verification status.

Missing before a pool integration can move funds

In order. Each item must be satisfied by a verifiable source; none of them can be assumed.

01
A privacy protocol deployed on Mainnet Beta
No shielded pool, privacy pool or private-transfer contract is published for Solana by any protocol whose documentation we could verify.
02
Official contract addresses and bytecode
Addresses must come from the protocol’s own documentation or registry and match the bytecode on chain (Sourcify or a reproducible build).
03
Documented integration terms and SDK
A supported SDK or documented contract interface for deposits, note/commitment handling, proofs and withdrawals.
04
Supported asset list
Which assets (ETH, USDG, Stock Tokens, …) the pool accepts and the denominations it uses.
05
Audit information and its scope
Published audit reports naming the audited commit and deployment; the UI shows exactly that scope, nothing wider.
06
Integration tests against the real deployment
Deposit, pending, confirmation, rejection, withdrawal and recovery flows exercised against the live or forked contracts before any button is enabled.

Protocols surveyed

Official pages, and what they list.

Privacy Pools (0xbow)
docs.privacypools.com
Solana Mainnet
RAILGUN
docs.railgun.org
Solana, Polygon, BNB Chain, Solana Testnet, Sepolia
Solana ecosystem listings
docs.robinhood.com
No privacy protocol listed for Mainnet Beta / 46630
Privacy Hood (self-described zk pool)
www.privacyhood.org
Testnet phase per its whitepaper; no contract addresses, audit or source published
VeiledHood (self-described shielded vault)
www.veiledhood.com
Contracts on 4663 but unverified; off-chain ledger with operator-signed withdrawals (custodial); own FAQ: testnet, not audited

What observers still see with any shielded pool

The transaction that funds a pool and the one that withdraws from it are public, including their timing and amounts.
Pool contracts, their balances and every deposit/withdrawal event are readable by anyone.
RPC providers and relayers see the addresses and calldata of the requests they serve.
Reusing an address, amount or timing pattern links deposits to withdrawals regardless of the protocol.

No claims

Nothing on this page is called untraceable, anonymous, audited, ZK-powered or MEV-proof. Stealth addresses hide the recipient only; every other fact of a payment stays public.